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Affirmative Action and Electoral Reform
The elimination of racial barriers to voting and to voter registration
has allowed racial minorities to achieve formal political equality.' Blacks
and Hispanics continue, however, to be significantly underrepresented in
state and local legislative bodies relative to their numbers in the general
population.2 In at-large elections, the dominant form of elections in
United States cities,3 these racial minorities usually lack the numerical
strength to ensure the election of minority candidates." Because of racial
prejudice and the distinctness of minority interests, they frequently are
unable to elect representatives by forming majority coalitions with other
groups.'
This Note seeks to identify a constitutionally permissible method of in-
creasing minority representation. It describes the current political under-
representation of blacks and Hispanics and finds that existing remedies
for discrimination in voting are inadequate to correct minority under-
representation. The Note argues that states should make voluntary efforts
to increase the representation of these racial minorities in state and local
legislative bodies. The Note proposes that such voluntary reforms are jus-
tified by the goal of including all minorities in the political process. Unlike
existing justifications for voluntary reform, the goal of political inclusion is
both consistent with equal protection doctrine and sufficient to support
thoroughgoing reform. Both gerrymandering district boundaries and
1. This Note defines formal political equality as universal equal suffrage for persons of voting
age. See J. Still, Voter Equality in Electoral Systems 25-28 (May 1977) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis in
Yale University Library).
2. Although a number of ethnic minorities, as well as women, are politically underrepresented,
this Note focuses on the need to improve the representation of blacks, Mexican-Americans, and
Puerto Ricans. Of the various ethnic minorities in the United States, these groups are the largest, see
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, POPULATION
CHARACTERISTICS, SERIES P-20, NO. 350, POPULATION PROFILE OF THE UNITED STATES: 1979, at 2
(1980) (25 million blacks, 7.3 million Mexican-Americans, and 1.7 million Puerto Ricans in United
States) [hereinafter cited as POPULATION PROFILE], and are among the poorest, see id. at 42-43 (me-
dian family income $10,879 for blacks, compared with $18,368 for whites); U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS, SE-
RIES P-20, NO. 347, PERSONS OF SPANISH ORIGIN IN*THE UNITED STATES: MARCH 1979, at 3 (adv.
rep. 1979) (median family income $12,800 for Mexican-Americans, and $8,300 for Puerto Ricans).
Moreover, these ethnic minorities have endured a long history of racial discrimination in the electoral
sphere. See U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE MEXICAN AMERICAN 9, 222-23(1968) (describing
use of language laws and physical intimidation to inhibit political participation by Mexican-Ameri-
cans); U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 1-10 (1968) (tracing history of black
disenfranchisement).
3. See [1979] MUNICIPAL Y. B. 99 (Int'l City Management Ass'n) (64% of United States cities
use at-large systems to elect city council members).
4. See p. 1813 infra (at-large elections lead to substantial underrepresentation of minorities).
5. See note 14 infra (minorities frequently unable to form biracial coalitions because of racial
prejudice).
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adopting structural voting schemes, such as proportional and cumulative
voting, can further the goal of political inclusion. Structural reforms are,
however, the preferred method of reform because they are the most pre-
cisely tailored and least drastic means of implementing the political inclu-
sion principle.
I. The Persistence of Minority Underrepresentation
Blacks and Hispanics are severely underrepresented in state and local
legislative bodies because of racial discrimination and economic depriva-
tion. These minorities would derive numerous benefits from improved
representation at state and local levels. Federal statutory and constitu-
tional provisions prohibiting racial discrimination in electoral systems do
not successfully address the problem of minority underrepresentation. In
order to increase the number of minority representatives, state and local
governments should voluntarily reform existing electoral systems to facili-
tate the election of more blacks and Hispanics.
A. The Need to Improve Minority Representation
Blacks and Hispanics are underrepresented in state and local legislative
bodies." Blacks hold approximately 50% of their proportionate share of
city council seats.7 Hispanics have less than 45% of their share of city
council representatives.8 Blacks and Hispanics are also seriously under-
represented in state legislatures.' The underrepresentation of blacks and
6. Racial minorities are also underrepresented in the United States Congress. See CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP., Jan. 24, 1981, at 200 (no black senators and only 18 black representatives in 1981);
M. LEVY & M. KRAMER, THE ETHNIC FACTOR 74 (1972) (only six members of Congress are Span-
ish-speaking Americans). This Note does not address the underrepresentation of ethnic minorities in
the United States Congress. Although many of the arguments in this Note apply to Congress as well
as to state and local legislatures, efforts to increase the number of minority representatives in Congress
would involve special problems. Given that each state elects only one senator in any single election, it
is impossible to devise a system for electing senators who represent every large minority group living
in a state. United States Representatives could be elected using multimember district systems that
foster minority representation. It would be exceedingly difficult, however, to change the long-standing
tradition of singlemember congressional districts.
7. See Jones, The Impact of Local Election Systems on Black Political Representation, 11 URB.
AFF. Q. 345, 350-51 (1976) (blacks occupy 43% of their proportionate share of city council seats in
cities that employ at-large elections, and 61% in cities that use district systems); Karnig, Black Repre-
sentation on City Councils, 12 URB. AFF. Q. 223, 226-27 (1976) (number of blacks serving on city
councils represents only 53% of blacks' proportionate share).
8. See Taebl, Minority Representation on City Councils- The Impact of Structure on Blacks and
Hispanics, 59 SOC. SCI. Q. 142, 145-46 (1978) (Spanish-speaking Americans have achieved 4417 of
their proportionate share of representatives on city councils).
9. See T. DYE, POLITICS IN STATES AND COMMUNITIES 123 (1973) (blacks seriously under-
represented in six of seven state legislatures studied). Americans of Spanish origin constitute 5.6% of
the total population, see POPULATION PROFILE, supra note 2, at 2, yet fewer than 1.1% of all state
legislators in the United States are of Spanish origin, see F. LEMUS, NATIONAL ROSTER OF SPANISH
SURNAMED ELECTED OFFICIALS 316-409 (1973) (less than 80 state legislators in United States are of
Spanish origin); COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES, 1980-81, at 85
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Hispanics in state and local legislative bodies is attributable to several
factors. The use of at-large municipal elections is "the single most impor-
tant variable" in explaining minority underrepresentation on city coun-
cils."0 Also, city councils with few members tend to include very few black
and Hispanic representatives.'" In addition, the continuing economic dep-
rivation these groups suffer 2 limits their ability to mobilize the resources
needed to conduct effective political campaigns." Finally, racial discrimi-
nation against these minorities hampers their ability to form coalitions
with other groups."4
These racial minorities would benefit significantly from the election of
more minority legislators. 5 Minority representatives serve as spokesmen
for the minority community, facilitating debate within minority ranks" as
well as expressing minority needs to the larger community. 7 Minority
(1980) (7,482 state legislators in United States).
10. Berry & Dye, The Discriminatory Effects of At-Large Elections, 7 FLA. ST. L. REV. 85, 113-
21 (1979) (regression analysis identified at-large system as most important variable explaining minor-
ity underrepresentation).
11. See Taebel, supra note 8, at 148-49 (smaller councils lead to significantly greater minority
underrepresentation).
12. See note 2 supra (median family income of blacks, Mexican-Americans, and Puerto Ricans
significantly less than that of whites).
13. See W. MULLEN, BLACK POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 100 (1972) (relative lack of financial re-
sources hampers black efforts to obtain political power even where blacks constitute a sizeable propor-
tion of the population); Note, Racial Vote Dilution in Multimember Districts: The Constitutional
Standard After Washington v. Davis, 76 MICH. L. REV. 694, 718 n.122 (1978) (past employment
discrimination limits number of minorities financially able to seek office or to support minority
candidates).
14. See A. CAMPBELL, P. CONVERSE, W. MILLER, & D. STOKES, THE AMERICAN VOTER 166-67
(1964) (ethnic group membership affects voting independently of variables such as income and educa-
tion); D. MATTHEWS & J. PROTHRO, NEGROES AND THE NEW SOUTHERN POLITICS 478-79 (1966)
(many blacks in the South are a permanent political minority because whites refuse to form biracial
coalitions); W. MULLEN, supra note 13, at 98 (majority of whites unwilling to vote for black
candidates).
15. See TAN 16-20 infra (listing benefits of increased minority representation). There is disagree-
ment, however, over whether a minority group has more influence when it constitutes a majority in
only a few districts or when the group is a strong minority in many districts. See Wright v. Rockefel-
ler, 376 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1964) (black plaintiffs and black intervenors disagreed over desirability of
concentrating black voters in a few districts). Racial minorities can probably exert more influence over
legislative outcomes by electing some minority legislators than by using their voting power to influence
how nonminority representatives vote. See Jones, Black Officeholders in Local Governments of the
South: An Overview, 2 POL. 49, 69 (1971) (black officeholders successful in insuring a more equitable
share of government benefits for their constituents); d. J. MCCARTHY, RACE AND POLITICAL ACTIV-
ITY IN AN URBAN CONTEXT 38 (1968) (swing vote influence does not ensure "that the most progres-
sive candidate on issues relevant to the Negro community is very progressive"); Wilson, The Negro in
Politics, in AMERICAN ETHNIC POLITICS 217, 227-29 (L. Fuchs ed. 1968) (blacks can exert influence
as marginal vote in an election only if white voters are divided and blacks are uncommitted). But c.
Lineberry, Reform, Representation and Policy, 59 SOc. SCI. Q. 173, 175-76 (1978) (no studies have
linked minority representation on city councils to greater allocation of municipal services to minority
community).
16. See S. VERBA, SMALL GROUPS AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 215 (1961) (leaders perform impor-
tant function of encouraging participation in group decisionmaking).
17. See W. BELL, R. HILL, & C. WRIGHT, PUBLIC LEADERSHIP 89 (1961) (ethnic group political
leaders perform valuable "bridging function" by expressing minority aspirations to majority).
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members also serve a policing function within political bodies."8 In addi-
tion, the election of minority representatives encourages greater political
consciousness and participation in the minority community.'9 Finally, the
election of more minority legislators would help to break down harmful
stereotypes of racial minorities as apathetic, docile, and incapable of
success.
20
B. The Inadequacy of Current Remedies for Racial Discrimination in
Voting
The Voting Rights Act of 196521 was enacted to eliminate racial barri-
ers to voting and voter registration.2 2 The Act prohibits the use of literacy
tests and other devices that prevent minority voting and voter registra-
tion. 3 Section 5 provides for federal review of state and local actions that
affect the right to vote" to ensure that they are not discriminatory in ei-
ther purpose or effect.2"
The Fifteenth Amendment and the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibit the denial or abridgement of the right to
vote because of race.2" These amendments have been used to strike down
18. The presence of minority legislators deters legislative discrimination by reminding representa-
tives that minority needs deserve the same consideration as those of the majority. Minority representa-
tives can also police racial abuses by public employees. See Campbell & Feagin, Black Politics in the
South: A Descriptive Analysis, 37 J. POL. 129, 154-55 (1975) (black Atlanta councilman stopped
racial discrimination by city employees).
19. See Latimer, Black Political Representation in Southern Cities, 15 URB. AFF. Q. 65, 80-81
(1979) (black voter turnout increases substantially when blacks no longer submerged in majority win,
at-large elections).
20. Stereotypes that depict racial minorities as inferior harm racial minorities in two ways.
Whites who adopt such stereotypes are likely to discriminate against racial minorities. See J. LEVIN,
THE FUNCTIONS OF PREJUDICE 22 (1975) (derogatory stereotypes of Mexican-Americans encourage
discrimination by justifying unequal treatment); c. B. ADAM, THE SURVIVAL OF DOMINATION 30-33
(1978) (ethnic prejudice transmitted from one generation to next by stereotypes depicting minorities as
inferior). In addition, stereotypes maligning racial minorities may adversely affect a minority's self-
image. See G. MARX, PROTEST AND PREJUDICE 69-70 (1967) (belief in stereotype that they are infer-
ior induces apathy in blacks).
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-1973bb-1 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
22. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966) (legislative purpose behind Act
was to eliminate racial discrimination in voting).
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973a-1973h (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976). See D. HUNTER, FEDERAL REVIEW OF VOTING CHANGES 20-32
(1975) (listing changes in electoral systems subject to federal preclearance under § 5).
25. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 172-73 (1980) (voting practice must not be
discriminatory in either purpose or effect to receive preclearance under § 5); Beer v. United States,
425 U.S. 130, 131-33 (1976) (section 5 prohibits state from instituting changes in voting procedures
unless it has obtained a declaratory judgment that changes are not discriminatory in purpose or
effect).
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race . . . ."); U.S. CONST.




the refusal to count votes,27 ballot box "stuffing,"2 grandfather clauses,29
"white primaries,""0 the gerrymandering of city boundaries,"' and minor-
ity vote dilution."
Judicial enforcement of the Voting Rights Act and the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments has dramatically increased levels of minority voter
registration and voting. Between 1950 and 1970, the proportion of south-
ern blacks registered to vote increased from one-fifth to two-thirds." Ad-
vances in minority voter registration have increased the number of blacks
and Hispanics who vote.' 4
This increase in minority voter registration and voting, however, has
not effectively increased the number of elected black and Hispanic repre-
sentatives. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Voting Rights Act to
prohibit only those changes in electoral systems that cause a retrogression
in minority representation." Moreover, fewer than ten states are subject
to section 5 of the Act. 6 All federal review under section 5 of the Act of
state action affecting the right to vote may soon end; the Act will expire in
27. See United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 386 (1915) (failure to count votes denies right to
vote).
28. See United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385, 389 (1944) ("stuffing" ballot box violates right to
vote).
29. See, e.g., Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275-77 (1939) (grandfather clause allowing persons
to register to vote only if they were registered as of a certain date violates Fifteenth Amendment);
Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 364-65 (1915) (grandfather clause violates Fifteenth
Amendment).
30. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469-70 (1953) (primary held by private political
organization that excludes blacks violates Fifteenth Amendment); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649,
663-64 (1944) (democratic primary excluding blacks violates Fifteenth Amendment).
31. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960) (redefinition of city boundaries to ex-
clude blacks violates Fifteenth Amendment).
32. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-70 (1973) (multimember districts that "cancel out
or minimize the voting strength" of racial minorities violate equal protection).
33. See M. LEVY & M. KRAMER, supra note 6, at 51 (1972) (number of voting age blacks regis-
tered to vote in South rose from 20% in 1952 to 67% in 1970). Since 1972 the proportion of eligible
voters registered to vote has decreased slightly for whites, blacks, and Hispanics. See U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, POPULATION CHARACTERIS-
TICS, SERIES P-20, No. 359, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 1980, at 3
(1980) (from 1972 to 1980, percentage of voting age population registered to vote decreased from 73%
to 68% for whites, from 65% to 60% for blacks, and from 44% to 36% for persons of Spanish origin).
34. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 33, at 1 (84% of registered blacks and 82% of
registered persons of Spanish origin voted in 1980 election, compared with 89% of registered whites).
35. See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141-42 (1976) (redistricting plan that resulted in
severe underrepresentation of blacks upheld because, for first time, "at least one and perhaps two"
blacks might be elected to the city council). The nonretrogression principle has been criticized on the
ground that it does not ensure representation for minorities in proportion to their numbers. See id. at
143 (White, J., dissenting) (section 5 should be interpreted to require that new electoral plan provide
blacks with "roughly proportional" representation); c. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination
Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV.
1049, 1104-05 (1978) (nonretrogression principle immunizes preexisting black underrepresentation
from judicial scrutiny).
36. See D. HUNTER, supra note 24, at 49 app. (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana,
Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia subject to requirements of § 5). In addition, 54
counties and 40 towns in other states are subject to the requirements of § 5. Id.
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1982,11 and it is possible that the Act will not be renewed. 8
Judicial interpretation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
has also limited their effectiveness in improving minority representation.
In City of Mobile v. Bolden, 9 the Supreme Court held that an electoral
scheme violates the equal protection clause of the Fifteenth Amendment
only if it was adopted or retained with the intent to discriminate." The
requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate that racial discrimination was a
"motivating factor" in the decision" places a heavy burden on minorities
challenging electoral schemes.4
Unless additional efforts are made to improve the ability of blacks and
Hispanics to elect representatives, these minorities will continue to be se-
verely underrepresented. Therefore, states should take affirmative steps to
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1976).
38. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1981, § A, at 10, col. 3 (city ed.) (describing split in Senate over
whether to renew Voting Rights Act).
39. 446 U.S. 55 (1980). In that case, black voters brought suit on the ground that the city's
electoral system unconstitutionally diluted their votes. Mobile's three city commissioners were selected
by majority vote in at-large elections. Id. at 59-60. Although blacks constituted over one-third of
Mobile's population, no black had ever been elected to the city commission. Id. at 97-98.
40. Id. at 66. Four justices took the position that evidence of the subjective motives of state legisla-
tors was necessary to demonstrate the presence of discriminatory intent. Id. at 71-74, 74 n.21. Justice
Stevens, concurring in the judgment, proposed that inquiry into motive should focus on the objective
effects of a decision, and found that the circumstances in Mobile supported the use of an electoral
system as common as that employed in Mobile. Id. at 90-92. The Mobile plurality also suggested that
racial animus may be required to demonstrate racially discriminatory intent. Id. at 71 n.17. But see
note 65 infra (criticizing animus intent test).
Prior to Mobile it was not necessary to show discriminatory intent to establish "minority vote
dilution." See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-70 (1973) (discriminatory intent not explicitly
required to establish vote dilution); Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 234 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 951 (1980) (Wisdom, J., specially concurring) (proof of discriminatory purpose irrelevant
under the Fifteenth Amendment); c. Note, supra note 13, at 720-26 (vote dilution properly consid-
ered part of fundamental rights, not antidiscrimination, law). But see Eisenberg, Disproportionate
Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36, 75 (1977)
(use of multimember districts in White may have been "tainted" by official racial discrimination in
other voting areas).
41. A showing that discriminatory intent was a "motivating factor" in a decision shifts the burden
of proof to the state to rebut the presumption of discriminatory action. See Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 n.21 (1977) (proof that decision was
"motivated in part" by discriminatory purpose shifts burden to state to establish that same decision
would have been reached had impermissible purpose not been considered); Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 241 (1976) (prima facie case of discriminatory purpose shifts burden to state to show that
racially neutral criteria produced decision).
42. Proving the subjective motivation of state officials is very difficult. See United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968) (motive inquiry requires "guesswork"); Note, Reading the Mind
of the School Board: Segregative Intent and the De Facto/De Jure Distinction, 86 YALE L.J. 317,
322-25 (1976) (theoretical and practical difficulties in subjective intent standard). In addition, plain-
tiffs frequently lack access to evidence of state officials' motives. See Perry, Modern Equal Protection:
A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1038 (1979) (defending party gener-
ally has readier, and sometimes exclusive, access to evidence of motivation). The intent standard itself
creates an incentive for state officials to conceal their discriminatory conduct. See United States v.
Texas Educ. Agency, 532 F.2d 380, 388 (5th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub
nom. Austin Independent School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976) (state officials likely to
pursue discriminatory practices "in ways that are devious, by methods subtle and illusive").
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increase the representation of these racial minorities in state and local leg-
islative bodies.
C. Alternative Methods of Increasing Minority Representation
State and local governments could adopt a variety of measures to in-
crease the ability of blacks and Hispanics to elect their own representa-
tives. Redistricting is one possible method of reform. 3 Where members of
a racial voting bloc are divided among numerous voting districts, it is un-
likely that they will be able to elect a representative. Concentrating mi-
nority voters within a few districts would enhance their ability to elect a
representative.
Another means of increasing minority representation would be to alter
the method of electing representatives. First, a majority win requirement
could be replaced with a rule that a candidate needs only a plurality of
votes to be elected."" Second, the number of seats in a district could be
increased.4" Third, voters might be allowed to engage in single-shot vot-
ing." All of these reforms would enhance the ability of minority groups to
elect their own representatives without the need to build coalitions with
other groups.
Cumulative, limited, or proportional voting systems are also effective
schemes for increasing the ability of minorities to elect representatives.
Cumulative voting leads to increased minority representation because it
allows voters to cast multiple votes for one candidate.47 Limited voting
43. See, e.g., R. DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION 461 (1968) (discussing redistricting as a
technique for increasing effectiveness of minority votes); Note, Compensatory Racial Reapportion-
ment, 25 STAN. L. REV. 84, 103-04 (1972) (proposing standard that would permit benign racial
redistricting if resulting district has minority population between 30% and 70% of total district
population).
44. A majority win requirement is a barrier to minority representation because it allows only a
majority of voters to elect a representative. See Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704, 725 (W.D. Tex.
1972), afi'd in part, rev'd in part, sub noma. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (majority win
requirements "strengthen the majority's ability to submerge a political or racial minority in a multi-
member district").
45. See Jones, supra note 7, at 351-52 (increased number of seats correlates strongly with im-
proved black representation on city councils in South and North Central regions); Taebel, supra note
8, at 147-49 (large council size dramatically improves Hispanic representation on city councils).
46. Single-shot voting allows minority voters to cast as few of their votes as they wish. If minority
voters are not permitted to single-shot their votes, they may be forced to cast votes for nonminority
candidates. See Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L. REV. 523, 554
n.127 (1973) (preventing single-shot voting deprives minorities of political influence in elections).
In some states laws prohibiting single-shot voting have been struck down on equal protection
grounds. See Dunston v. Scott, 336 F. Supp. 206, 213 (E.D.N.C. 1972) (no rational basis for apply-
ing anti-single-shot law to only some cities); Stevenson v. West, No. 72-45 (D.S.C. Apr. 7, 1972)
(anti-single-shot voting law violates equal protection). But see Gordon v. Meeks, 394 F.2d 3 (5th Cir.
1968) (per curiam) (anti-single-shot law upheld).
47. See, e.g., R. DIXON, supra note 43, at 523 (cumulative voting enables minority groups larger
than 25% of all voters to elect one of three representatives); E. LAKEMAN, How DEMOCRACIES VOTE
85-88 (1970) (discussing use of cumulative voting).
1817
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 90: 1811, 1981
systems facilitate minority representation by prohibiting voters from vot-
ing for each seat to be filled." In a proportional voting system, voters must
list the candidates in order of preference." Since each vote is counted for
the first candidate on a voter's list who needs that vote in order to be
elected, no votes are "wasted" on a candidate who already has a sufficient
number of votes to be elected. Proportional voting schemes ensure that all
groups sufficiently large to command at least one seat are represented in
proportion to their voting strength.
II. Judicial Review of Legislative Reforms to Increase Minority
Representation
Voluntary government plans that are adopted for the purpose of in-
creasing minority representation will be challenged as violations of equal
protection. 0 In equal protection analysis, the court first determines
whether there has been a sufficient showing of discrimination to establish
a prima facie violation of equal protection. Both discriminatory intent and
impact are necessary to violate the equal protection clause."' The state
may rebut a prima facie violation by demonstrating that the governmental
action being challenged serves an important or compelling state interest.12
48. The more the vote is limited, the greater are minority opportunities to elect representatives.
For example, in a four-seat district, if each voter has three votes, the minority must number three-
sevenths of all voters to elect one representative. If each voter is limited to two votes, the minority can
elect a candidate if it exceeds one-third of the electorate. See E. LAKEMAN, supra note 47, at 80-84.
49. Proportional voting systems allow voters either to vote for one party or to indicate their pref-
erences among the candidates of all parties. See E. LAKEMAN, supra note 47, at 105. Under either
system, the number of seats is divided by the total votes cast. The resulting "quota" is the number of
votes that entitles a party or candidate to a seat. The first system requires that voters cast their ballots
for a party's list of candidates. The votes a party receives are then used to elect that party's candidates
in the order they appear on that party's list. Id. at 90-93. Under the second system, the "single
transferable vote," voters may list candidates in order of preference. All voters who express the same
preferences are proportionally represented. Id. at 109.
50. Two types of plaintiffs are likely to challenge race-conscious, voluntary government actions to
increase minority representation. A challenge might be brought by members of the white majority
whose representative strength has been reduced. Cf. Offermann v. Nitkowski, 378 F.2d 22 (2d Cir.
1967) (challenge by whites to voluntary desegregation plan to remedy de facto segregation). Also,
minorities not benefited by a plan designed to assist another minority group may challenge the plan
on the ground that it does not include them. See United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144
(1977) (challenge by Hasidic Jews to redistricting plan creating predominantly black districts).
51. See Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J.
1205, 1252 n.139 (1970) (equal protection violated by discriminatory intent "accompanied by only
that quantum of impact it takes to vest standing"); cf Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-41
(1976) (discriminatory purpose needed in addition to disproportionate racial impact to violate equal
protection). But cf City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 378-79 (1975) (annexation
made for purpose of discriminating against blacks violates § 5 of Voting Rights Act "whatever its
actual effect"); note 70 infra (stigmatic harm satisfies impact requirement of equal protection). The
Supreme Court arrived at the present standard for an equal protection violation by evolutionary steps.
See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 148 n.4 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing cases sup-
porting conflicting propositions that only impermissible purpose, only impermissible effects, or either
impermissible purpose or effects violates equal protection).
52. In traditional equal protection analysis, a governmental classification must serve a "compel-
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In order for the plan to be constitutional, the court must also find that the
government action is precisely tailored to serve the asserted state interest,
and that the government has selected the least drastic means available for
achieving its purpose. 3
Courts have proposed two theories to support electoral reforms designed
to increase minority representation that harm other groups. The first the-
ory is that adoption of such reforms does not constitute actionable discrim-
ination. 4 The second theory is that efforts to improve minority represen-
ling" governmental interest to survive strict scrutiny. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 299 (1978) (Powell, J.); id. at 357 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting
in part). Intermediate level scrutiny demands that the state action "substantially" serve an "impor-
tant" governmental objective. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
The Court has not explicitly decided which standard to apply in affirmative action cases. In Bakke,
Justice Powell proposed that affirmative action plans be subject to strict scrutiny, 438 U.S. at 299,
while Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun suggested that such plans need only satisfy
the requirements of intermediate scrutiny, id. at 361. In practice the Court has applied a standard of
review in affirmative action cases that is less rigorous than traditional strict scrutiny. Compare Fulli-
love v. Klutznick, 100 S. Ct. 2758, 2795-97 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment) (summary
approval of minority business preference) and Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-13 (Powell, J.) (state's interest
in promoting academic diversity sufficient to uphold preferential admissions policy) with Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (traditional strict scrutiny of racial classification). An intermediate
standard is appropriate in the affirmative action context given that political constraints will prevent
adoption of all but the least controversial preferential programs. See Perry, supra note 42, at 1050.
53. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973); Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972). The requirement that the means be precisely tailored to serve
the government objective applies to intermediate as well as to strict scrutiny. See Alevy v. Downstate
Medical Center, 39 N.Y.2d 326, 336-37, 348 N.E.2d 537, 546, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82, 90 (1976) (interme-
diate scrutiny requires that no "less objectionable racial" means of serving affirmative action goals be
available); Perry, supra note 42, at 1045, 1048-49 (intermediate standard requires "any preferential
program be designed to accomplish its objective in a manner that causes as little resentment as possi-
ble" among whites).
54. The paradigm for voluntary, non-remedial affirmative action by the state is the voluntary
elimination of de facto segregation in public schools. Prior to Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (1978), voluntary school integration plans were not subject to strict or intermediate
scrutiny. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (school
authorities may prepare students to live in pluralistic society by prescribing for each school ratio of
black to white students reflecting proportion for district as whole); Pride v. Community School Bd.,
488 F.2d 321, 326-27 (2d Cir. 1973) (no court has applied strict scrutiny where state action has had
effect and objective of reducing discrimination); Fuller v. Volk, 230 F. Supp. 25, 33-35 (D.N.J.
1964), vacated, 351 F.2d 323 (3d Cir. 1965) (desegregation of de facto segregated schools does not
constitute racial discrimination against whites "of constitutional dimensions"). But see Norwalk
CORE v. Norwalk Bd. of Educ., 423 F.2d 121, 124-25 (2d Cir. 1970) (Kaufman, J., dissenting)
(voluntary busing to achieve school integration must be "scrutinized carefully"); Ely, The Constitu-
tionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 736 n.49 (1974) (rejecting argu-
ment that voluntary busing plans are not suspect because burden on individuals is "trivial").
Application of strict or intermediate scrutiny to affirmative action plans first gained support in the
Supreme Court in the sex discrimination field. See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 358-59 (1974)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (intermediate level scrutiny appropriate for both programs designed to bene-
fit women and sexual classifications disadvantaging women); id. at 361 (White, J., dissenting) (same).
In Bakke, Justice Brennan stated that the voluntary desegregation cases recognized "racial pluralism"
in schools as "a compelling social goal justifying the overt use of race." 438 U.S. at 363. Since Bakke,
the state's interest in promoting integration has proven adequate to support race-conscious efforts to
reduce de facto segregation despite application of strict scrutiny to such plans. See Johnson v. Board of
Educ., 604 F.2d 504, 515-17, 515 n.5 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 3055, vacated, 101 S.
Ct. 339 (1980) (compelling state interest in integration sufficient to sustain voluntary state efforts to
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tation do constitute actionable discrimination, but are justified when they
serve the important state interest of remedying past discrimination. The
first theory is inconsistent with recent equal protection analysis,"5 and the
second, while constitutionally sound, has too limited an application to sup-
port widespread efforts to increase the number of minority representatives.
Given the inadequacies of these theories, this Note proposes that the goal
of including all minorities in the political process is an important state
interest that supports affirmative action in the electoral sphere. This justi-
fication would support electoral reform even in the absence of a finding of
past discrimination by the governing body.
A. The Existence of Actionable Discrimination
One theory that has been advanced to support the constitutionality of
affirmative action in electoral reform is that adoption of a scheme to in-
crease minority representation does not constitute actionable discrimina-
tion. This theory is erroneous because adoption of such a scheme is dis-
criminatory in intent and produces a discriminatory harm.
The Supreme Court relied on the theory that affirmative action in elec-
toral reform does not involve cognizable discrimination in United Jewish
Organizations v. Carey (UJO).5 ' To comply with section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act, the New York State Legislature adopted a redistricting plan
to increase the number of nonwhite state legislators elected from parts of
New York City. 7 In order to create "safe" nonwhite districts, state offi-
cials divided a Hasidic Jewish community into two separate districts."8
The Hasidim argued that the plan diluted the value of their votes in order
to achieve a racial quota in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments.
Although the Court did not agree on any one rationale, 9 a majority
upheld the redistricting on the theory that it was not discriminatory. Jus-
slow white flight despite application of strict scrutiny); cf. Parent Ass'n v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705,
719-20 (2d Cir. 1979) (minority students' choice of schools could be restricted in order to promote
integration despite application of strict scrutiny).
55. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S. Ct. 2758, 2781 (1980) (plurality opinion) (any racial
preference must receive "searching examination"); id. at 2796 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment)
(remedial affirmative action plans must satisfy intermediate scrutiny); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 359 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(same); id. at 289-91 (Powell, J.) (all racial classifications merit strict scrutiny).
56. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
57. Id. at 151-52.
58. Id. at 152.
59. Justice White's plurality opinion rested on both statutory and constitutional grounds. Justices
Brennan and Blackmun joined in only that part of Justice White's opinion that rested on statutory
considerations, while Justice Rehnquist joined in only the constitutional analysis. Justice Stevens
joined in both parts of Justice White's opinion. Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Powell, concurred in
the judgment. Chief Justice Burger dissented from the judgment, and Justice Marshall did not par-
ticipate in the decision.
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tices White, Stevens, and Rehnquist found that no discrimination had
taken place because the plan did not stigmatize any race." Furthermore,
they argued that the plan did not deny the Hasidim "fair" representation
because the redistricting would result in the election of white and non-
white representatives in proportion to their numbers in the redistricted
communities. 1 Justice Stewart, speaking for himself and for Justice Pow-
ell, argued that the gerrymander had neither the purpose nor the effect of
discriminating against whites.' The purpose of the plan, he stated, was to
comply with the Voting Rights Act, 3 and the plan did not "undervalue"
the political power of white voters."
The conclusion that the redistricting plan in UJO did not result in dis-
crimination ignores the discriminatory features of this type of reform. A
legislature intentionally discriminates on the basis of race whenever it uses
race as a decisionmaking criterion." In addition, a plan designed to help
60, 430 U.S. at 165.
61. Id. at 166. Justices White, Rhnquist, and Stevens argued that the redistricting plan was
constitutional regardless of the fact that it had been adopted to comply with the Voting Rights Act.
Even absent the Act, Justice White asserted, it would be constitutional for "a State in which a racial
minority is unable to elect representatives from multimember districts to change to single-member
districting for the purpose of increasing minority representation." Id. at 167.
62. Id. at 179-80.
63. Id. at 180.
64. Id. at 179-80.
65. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S. Ct. 2758, 2811 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting on other
grounds) (equal protection clause imposes special obligation on courts to scrutinize race-conscious
governmental decisionmaking because "procedural safeguards. . . play a vital part in preserving the
impartial character of the legislative process"); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977) ("proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating
factor" in a decision triggers judicial scrutiny); Brest, The Supreme Court 1975 Term, Foreword: In
Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6-8 (1976) (all race-dependent
decisions are presumptively irrational).
This presumption of irrationality extends to facially neutral laws that are race-dependent as well as
to explicit racial classifications. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) ("ostensibly
neutral" decisions that are race-dependent are presumptively invalid); Brest, supra, at 12-15 (facially
neutral laws and decisions, if race-dependent, presumptively violate equal protection).
By contrast, the plurality in City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), suggested that racially
discriminatory purpose is present only when a decision is made at least in part "because of" its
"adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Id. at 71 n.17. The Court has mentioned this standard in
earlier opinions. See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (same language as in
Mobile); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)
(decision motivated by "invidious discriminatory purpose" tiiggers judicial review). The view that
state action based on race is subject to judicial scrutiny only if motivated by a desire to harm a racial
group is inconsistent with other features of equal protection doctrine, see Perry, supra note 42, at
1037 n.70 (racial considerations that are not invidious sufficient to trigger judicial scrutiny), including
the Court's treatment of affirmative action plans, see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 299 (1978) (Powell, J.) (official decisions that "touch upon an individual's race or ethnic back-
ground" trigger strict scrutiny); id. at 359 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (remedial affirmative action plans must satisfy intermediate scrutiny). That racial
discrimination is motivated by racial animus is highly probative that no legitimate state interest exists
that will support the discrimination, but a plaintiff should not have to demonstrate racial animus in
order to establish a prima facie violation of equal protection.
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one minority will often harm other minorities." Moreover, all race-depen-
dent decisions and racial classifications encourage racial consciousness and
animosity regardless of the purposes for which they are made."
The race-conscious redistricting plan in UJO harmed the Hasidim in
two ways. First, adoption of the plan decreased the effectiveness of the
Hasidim's votes by depriving them of their ability to vote as a bloc.", This
was true even though the plan was designed to lead to the election of
white and nonwhite representatives in proportion to their numbers in the
community.69 Second, adoption of the redistricting plan imposed a stig-
matic harm on the Hasidim."0 The redistricting arguably caused the
66. See United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 174 (1977) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) ("[Tihe natural consequence of our governing processes [is] that the most 'discrete and insular'
of whites often will be called upon to bear the immediate, direct costs of benign discrimination.");
Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro-The Problem of Special
Treatment, 61 NW. U.L. REV. 363, 373-74 (1966) (preferential treatment for blacks most likely to
burden Puerto Ricans, Mexican-Americans, and other minorities). The danger that a benign program
might in fact be malevolent, or have malevolent effects, justifies thorough judicial examination of such
programs. Cf. United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 173 (1977) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) ("if judicial detection of truly benign policies proves impossible or excessively crude," perhaps
all racial classifications should be invalidated).
67. See Kaplan, supra note 66, at 379-80 (use of racial criteria by state places educative force of
government behind belief that race is relevant to individual worth); Perry, supra note 42, at 1044-45"
(affirmative action plans that disadvantage whites stimulate racial resentment and hostility).
68. Courts have frequently held that changes in electoral systems that decrease an individual's
chances of forming a successful electoral coalition constitute a cognizable constitutional injury. See,
e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (exclusion of black voters from voting district vio-
lates Fifteenth Amendment); Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977) (splitting black voters among several districts violates equal protection);
d. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 140 n.39 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting on other
grounds) (requirement of discriminatory effect satisfied by showing that adoption of electoral scheme
brought about retrogression in group's voting strength); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 388-89
(1971) (annexation of white communities dilutes black votes under Voting Rights Act).
69. There are at least two possible theories concerning what satisfies the impact requirement of
equal protection. According to one theory, a discriminatory harm occurs when a race-dependent deci-
sion results in unequal treatment of blacks and whites. In Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971),
the Court upheld the dosing of segregated municipal swimming pools despite allegations of illicit
motive on the ground that the closing affected blacks and whites equally. Id. at 225. The Court
limited this aspect of Palmer, however, in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), by stating that
neither discriminatory purpose nor effect was present in Palmer. Id. at 242-43.
An alternative theory, and the one this Note adopts, is that the impact requirement of equal protec-
tion is satisfied by showing that an individual is in a worse position than he or she would have been as
a result of a race-dependent decision. This test is satisfied by a race-conscious decision that burdens an
individual even if the decision burdens blacks and whites "equally" or creates a mechanism, such as
an electoral system, that results in the "equal" treatment of blacks and whites. Cf Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 8, 10-11 (1967) (statute forbidding miscegenation unconstitutional); Goss v. Board of
Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963) (statute allowing students of any race to transfer to schools where their
race is in the majority unconstitutional).
70. The redistricting plan in UJO may have been motivated by anti-Semitism, see Ely, supra note
54, at 737-38 (racial preferences that disproportionately burden Jews are presumptively invalid be-
cause likely to be motivated by anti-Semitism), and thus was likely perceived as anti-Semitic by both
Jews and non-Jews. But see United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 165 (1977) (plu-
rality opinion) (redistricting plan in UJO "represented no racial slur or stigma with respect to whites
or any other race").
Stigmatic harm is sufficient to satisfy the impact requirement of equal protection. See Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954) (stigmatic harm sufficient to invalidate legally segre-
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Hasidim to feel that, compared to blacks, they were less worthy of govern-
ment protection.
The plaintiff in UJO represented the members of an ethnic minority.
White majority voters, however, would also have a valid equal protection
claim if they were submerged in safe minority districts by redistricting.7"
Legislative decisionmaking infected by racial considerations is discrimina-
tory in intent regardless of whether the adversely affected group is in the
minority. In addition, white majority voters submerged in safe minority
districts suffer a discriminatory harm. Their votes are diluted because the
group is deprived of its ability to vote effectively as part of a racial bloc.
In UJO the legislature employed the technique of redistricting to in-
crease minority representation. Any other type of scheme to improve mi-
nority representation, however, would also be discriminatory. 2 Cumula-
tive or proportional voting systems, for example, can improve the ability
of minorities to elect representatives. Where these schemes replace major-
ity win systems, it is unlikely that the majority will elect as many repre-
sentatives as it could under the prior electoral system. This loss in ability
to elect representatives is sufficient to support a prima facie violation of
equal protection.73
B. The Remedial Jusdtfication
Assuming that adoption of electoral reforms to increase minority repre-
sentation would constitute actionable discrimination, an important state
interest is necessary to justify the reform." Voluntary efforts to increase
minority representation may be justified on the theory that the state has
an important interest in remedying the effects of past discrimination.
The remedial justification can support a variety of strategies for increasing
minority representation, including redistricting.76 In many states and cit-
gated schools); Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legisla-
tive Motive, 1971 SuP. CT. REV. 95, 116 & n.110 (member of minority group has cause of action if
stigmatized by racially motivated decision that was "useful and fair").
71. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S. Ct. 2758, 2798 (1980) (Stewart, J., joined by Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (Constitution forbids racial discrimination "whatever the race may be of those who are its
victims"); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-90 (1978) (Powell, J.) (persons of
different color afforded same equal protection rights); id. at 359-61 (Brennan, J., concurring in judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part) (affirmative action plans that burden whites are presumptively
unconstitutional).
72. See pp. 1817-18 supra (describing effectiveness of various methods of increasing minority
representation).
73. See note 68 supra (loss of ability to elect representatives satisfies impact requirement of equal
protection).
74. See note 52 supra (discussing appropriateness of intermediate scrutiny standard).
75. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 366 n.42 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (state's interest in remedying past discrimina-
tion sufficient to justify affirmative action).
76. See pp. 1817-18 supra (discussing various methods of increasing minority representation).
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ies, the remedial justification provides an adequate legal basis for increas-
ing minority representation to appropriate levels.
The remedial justification is, however, a limited solution to the problem
of minority underrepresentation. First, it can be invoked only if under-
representation is the result of past discrimination by a state or local gov-
ernment.7 But minority underrepresentation is attributable largely to ra-
cially polarized voting." Thus, the remedial justification does not reach a
major source of minority underrepresentation.
Second, state and local governments may not be competent to make the
finding of past discrimination that supplies the predicate for legislative
affirmative action under the remedial theory. The Supreme Court has
suggested that by virtue of section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Con-
gress is the most competent of any government body to make findings of
past discrimination." The Court has not yet decided whether state and
local governments are less competent to make such findings."0
77. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S. Ct. 2758, 2800 (1980) (Stewart, J., joined by Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (minority set-aside unconstitutional because no evidence of past discrimination by Con-
gress); id. at 2806-07 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (insufficient evidence of past discrimination in federal or
federally funded programs to support remedial action); c. id. at 2777 (plurality opinion) (Congress
may condition grant of federal funds to states on requirement that states avoid discriminatory conduct
that Congress could outlaw directly); id. at 2788 (Powell, J., concurring) (sufficient evidence of past
"private and governmental discrimination" to uphold remedial set-aside). But see Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 366 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (past "societal racial discrimination" can support remedial affirmative action). See
generally The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (state action required to invoke Fourteenth
Amendment); N. DORSEN, P. BENDER, B. NEUBORNE, & S. LAW, 2 EMERSON, HABER, & DORSEN'S
POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 386-432 (4th ed. 1979) (describing state action
requirement). State inaction may also be discriminatory. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55,
74 n.21 (1980) (plurality opinion) (raising possibility that Mobile's electoral system was retained for
a discriminatory purpose); Brest, supra note 65, at 14-15 ("racially selective indifference" can violate
equal protection).
78. See note 14 supra (minorities are frequently unable to form biracial coalitions because of
racial prejudice). Individuals who vote along racial lines do not violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth
Amendments. See United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 167 (1977) (plurality opin-
ion). But see Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L.
REV. 540, 570-71 (1977) (multimember district system used by voters "as a vehicle of racial discrimi-
nation" becomes "infected with discriminatory purpose" and violates equal protection).
79. In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S. Ct. 2758 (1980), the Court placed considerable emphasis on
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to support Congress' power to enact the minority set-aside pro-
gram. Chief Justice Burger found that, since the Constitution expressly charges Congress with the
"competence and authority to enforce equal protection guarantees," Congress has the most compre-
hensive remedial power of any "organ of government, state or federal." Id. at 2777. In a concurring
opinion, Justice Powell also emphasized Congress' "unique constitutional power" to enforce the Four-
teenth Amendment. Id. at 2786.
80. In Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), Justice Brennan found that
states as well as Congress could adopt race-conscious programs to remedy past discrimination. Id. at
366. In addition, Justice Brennan argued that the State of California could delegate this responsibility
to the Board of Regents. Id. at 366 n.42. Justice Powell, on the other hand, stated that the University
was incompetent to make findings of past discrimination. Id. at 309.
One interpretation of Justice Powell's competence test is that only Congress can make findings of
past discrimination. Cf Comment, Beyond Strict Scrutiny: The Limits of Congressional Power to Use
Racial Classifications, 74 NW. U.L. REV. 617, 644-45 (1979) ("[Slection five of the fourteenth
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Third, the remedial justification only supports those electoral reforms
that are necessary to remedy the past discrimination. A remedial plan will
be struck down if it is overinclusive or if a less drastic means of achieving
the remedial purpose is available.81 For example, a change in the racial
mix of electoral districts or in the method of electing representatives might
be an overinclusive means of remedying past discrimination in voter regis-
tration. Alternatively, a court might find that a state-supported minority
voter registration drive would be a less drastic means for achieving the
remedial purpose.
C. An Alternative Important State Interest: Including Minorities in the
Political Process
In light of the deficiencies of current rationales for affirmative action in
the electoral sphere, a new justification is required to defend such reforms.
This Note proposes that the goal of including all minorities in the politi-
cal process is an important state interest that supports electoral reform to
increase minority representation.
The inclusion of minorities in the political process was an important
goal of the founding fathers. They designed our constitutional system to
encourage political pluralism and to protect minority interests from the
tyranny of the majority. According to Madison, the existence of numerous
factions in the legislature makes it "less probable that a majority of the
whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens
... .",82 The separation of powers doctrine and the division of authority
between the federal and state governments were intended to ensure that
minority interests would continue to have a voice in government
amendment enables Congress to accomplish affirmative action goals that are denied to the states.")
Another interpretation of Powell's standard is that only certain subdivisions of state government are
incompetent to make findings of past discrimination. This interpretation views local legislative bodies
(or boards of regents) as less competent than state legislatures on the ground that the former lack the
resources and experience to make trustworthy determinations about past discrimination. Either inter-
pretation of the competence test is open to criticism. See Wright, Color-Blind Theories and Color-
Conscious Remedies, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 213, 229-30 (1980) (education professionals most competent
to design remedies for past discrimination in education); The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV.
L. REV. 75, 134-35 (1980) (equal protection limitation imposed on states "substantially equivalent" to
that imposed on Congress).
81. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S. Ct. 2758, 2779-80 (1980) (plurality opinion) (minority set-
aside program would be unconstitutional without provision for administrative rebuttal of presumption
that minority contractors had suffered from discrimination); . Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 377-78 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)
("categorical means" of dispensing benefits may be used when case-by-case inquiry into past discrimi-
nation is "impossible or extremely impractical").
82. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 at 83 (Mentor ed. J. Madison). Madison believed that the use of
representative government in a country as large as the United States would guarantee the existence of
many factions in the national government. See id. ("Extend the sphere and you take in a greater
variety of parties and interests . . .")
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decisionmaking.83
Including minorities in the political process strengthens our political
system. The presence of minority legislators who can vote on and monitor
legislative actions increases the legislature's responsiveness to minority in-
terests.8" Thus, legislative decisions will more accurately reflect the inter-
ests of all members of society. The perception that their interests are rep-
resented in the legislature will enhance minority identification with their
government and lead to greater acceptance of governmental action."
The goal of including minorities in the political process supports in-
creased representation for all minorities. Thus, state efforts to reallocate
political power from one minority to another would be inconsistent with
the goal of political inclusion. 6 Reducing majority representation in order
to achieve greater minority representation, however, would be consistent
with this principle.
III. Implementation of the Goal of Political Inclusion
Both redistricting and structural electoral reforms are designed to open
the political process to all minorities. They are intended to allow minori-
ties above a certain minimum size to elect their own representatives and
can enhance the ability of all minorities to form effective electoral coali-
tions. Hence, both types of electoral schemes satisfy the requirement of
equal protection review that the challenged government action serve an
important state interest.
Although both redistricting and structural electoral reforms may effec-
tively increase minority representation, the latter represent a more pre-
cisely tailored and less drastic method of implementing the political inclu-
sion principle than redistricting. Thus, structural reforms are the only
permissible government strategy for increasing the number of minority
83. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 80 (1980) (by breaking up government authority
among the three branches of thp national government as well as between the federal and state govern-
ments, the Constitution attempts to prevent any one faction from obtaining "sufficient clout to be able
to tyrannize others").
84. See J. S. MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 215 (New York 1862)
("To be under the eyes of others-to have to defend one's self to others-is never more important
than to those who act in opposition to the opinion of others, for it obliges them to have a sure ground
of their own.")
85. Cf. note 19 supra (minority political participation increases when minorities no longer sub-
merged in at-large elections).
86. Furthermore, no criteria exist to guide efforts to redistribute political power among different
disadvantaged minorities. The concept of "discrete and insular minorities," see United States v.
Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), refers to all insular minorities and does not iden-
tify degrees of insularity. Nor does the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment identify a
hierarchy of protected racial minorities. It is unclear what rights the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment sought to secure for blacks. See Perry, supra note 42, at 1025-28 (Fourteenth Amend-
ment may have been meant to constitutionalize only specific provisions of the Civil Rights Act of
1866).
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representatives. Although some of the structural reforms discussed in this
Note have not been commonly employed in the United States, their adop-
tion would not have adverse effects on our political system.
A. Alternative Means of Implementing the Goal of Political Inclusion
In order to survive scrutiny under the equal protection clause, a chal-
lenged government action must be precisely tailored to serve an important
state interest and must represent the least drastic means available for
achieving the government's purpose." Structural electoral reforms such as
proportional and cumulative voting best meet those requirements. Since
state and local governments can always adopt structural reforms rather
than redistrict, redistricting is never a constitutionally permissible method
of furthering the political inclusion of minorities.
1. Redistricting
Increasing minority representation through race-conscious redistricting
sometimes will fail to serve the important state interest of including mi-
norities in the political process. Ethnic minorities commonly live in prox-
imity to each other."8 Hence, individuals submerged in districts made safe
for one minority are likely to be members of another minority. Decreasing
one minority's representation in order to increase the representation of
another minority violates the principle of political inclusion."
Even if a redistricting plan satisfies the principle of political inclusion,
it is not the most appropriately tailored method of increasing minority
representation. First, redistricting is an underinclusive means of achieving
this goal. Given that some minimum voting strength is required to carry a
district, redistricting cannot benefit very small minority groups. In addi-
tion, redistricting is not a suitable means of increasing the representation
of minorities that are dispersed throughout a community.90 It is virtually
87. See note 53 supra (both strict and intermediate standards require state to use least burden-
some and most narrowly drawn means of furthering its goal).
88. See L. GREBLER, J. MOORE, & R. GUZMAN, THE MEXICAN-AMERICAN PEOPLE 274-79
(1970) (study of 35 central cities in the Southwest found significant residential integration between
Hispanics and blacks, Hispanics and Orientals, and Hispanics and American Indians); c. U.S. BU-
REAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SPECIAL STUDIES, P-
23 SERIES, NO. 49, POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES 93 (1974) (81% of blacks, 85% of Mexican-
Americans, and 98% of Puerto Ricans live in urban areas). But see Los Angeles Times, June 14,
1981, § II (Metro), at 1, col. 4 ("In Los Angeles County, Latinos and blacks are as segregated from
each other as they are individually from whites.")
89. See p. 1826 supra (inclusion principle does not support reallocation of political power from
one minority to another). A remedial justification, however, can support such reforms. See United
Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 160-62 (1977) (plurality opinion).
90. Mexican-Americans, for example, tend to be dispersed, see L. GREBLER, J. MOORE, & R.
GUZMAN, supra note 88, at 274-75 (in Southwest and West residential patterns for Hispanics are
more dispersed than for blacks), and thus redistricting plans may not aid them. See Taebel, supra note
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impossible for a redistricting scheme to form safe districts out of geo-
graphically scattered individuals. Moreover, individual minority members
who are excluded from safe minority districts have no effective voice in
determining who will represent the minority community.
Racial gerrymandering of district lines also encourages racial conflict
and consciousness and therefore is not the least drastic means of further-
ing the goal of political inclusion. Racially safe districts reinforce minority
group isolation by physically segregating voters according to race. Dis-
tricting encourages voting along racial lines because voters in safe districts
have little incentive to form coalitions with members of other groups.
Thus, racially safe districts discourage political association and compro-
mise among racial groups." In addition, the harsh and unequal burdens
redistricting imposes on members of the majority foster resentment of af-
firmative action. Majority members submerged in safe minority districts
become a new powerless minority while other majority voters may suffer
little, if any, loss in the effectiveness of their votes."
2. Structural Reforms
Adoption of a variety of structural voting reforms would best further
the goal of including all minorities in the political process. Structural re-
forms such as adopting plurality win requirements or single-shot, cumula-
tive, limited, or proportional voting systems" are the most precisely tai-
lored and least drastic means of enhancing minority representation. These
types of reforms should be the exclusive means of furthering the goal of
political inclusion.
First, structural schemes are unlikely to be underinclusive. Any minor-
ity group present in sufficient numbers has the opportunity to elect its
own representative, even if the group is dispersed throughout the commu-
nity."' Although certain minority groups may include so few members that
they will not be able to elect their own representative, their ability to form
8, at 151 ("[A] geographical system of representation, such as the district system, may not materially
benefit hispanics.").
91. See United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 172-73 (1977) (Brennan, J., con-
curring) (racially safe districts may frustrate "potentially successful efforts at coalition building across
racial lines").
92. In United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977), for example, the redistricting
plan did not reduce the number of non-Hasidic white legislators likely to be elected. Id. at 163.
Unequal distribution of the burdens of affirmative action may also violate the requirement that the
state use the least drastic means of accomplishing its goal. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S. Ct. 2758,
2793 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (race-conscious remedies permissible only if burden on "innocent
third parties" sufficiently "limited" and "dispersed" to be consistent with "fundamental fairness").
93. See pp. 1817-18 supra (describing structural methods of increasing minority representation).
94. Single-member districts are not necessary to maintain group cohesion. See Parenti, Ethnic
Politics and the Persistence of Ethnic Identification, 61 AM. POL. SC. REV. 717, 721 (1967) (residen-
tial segregation not prerequisite for existence of ethnic "sub-societal structure").
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effective electoral coalitions will be enhanced.95 Furthermore, because
structural reforms do not submerge any minority voters in the safe dis-
tricts of another group, they enhance the ability of all individual members
of minority groups to elect their own representatives or to form decisive
coalitions.
Second, structural electoral reforms are a less drastic means of improv-
ing minority representation. Although structural reforms facilitate racial
bloc voting by reducing the number of voters who need to vote together to
elect a candidate, they do not encourage it to the same degree as redistrict-
ing. Proportional and cumulative voting do not discourage voters from
forming biracial coalitions. In addition, if racial bloc voting decreases,
structural reforms allow voters to coalesce freely, whereas racially safe
districts permanently discourage biracial coalition building. Moreover,
structural reforms minimize majority resentment of affirmative action by
equitably distributing the burdens of electoral reform. Majority members
share the burden of structural reforms equally; no members of the major-
ity are submerged in safe minority districts.
B. Objections to Structural Reform
Several of the electoral devices supported by the principle of political
inclusion-including a large number of seats per district, plurality win
requirements, and single-shot voting-are already used by some states and
municipalities. 6 Governments can adopt these mechanisms without mak-
ing major changes in existing electoral systems. Cumulative, limited, and
proportional voting systems are not, however, common in this country.97
Some critics contend that states should not institute such reforms because
they would adversely affect our political system. These critics argue that
such systems are too complicated for voters to exploit effectively and that
95. Replacing a majority win system with a proportional or plurality win system, for example,
will reduce the number of voters who need to vote together to elect a candidate. This will allow even a
small minority group to form successful coalitions with other voters more easily. Where a district plan
is in effect and minorities are submerged in each district, change to a proportional or cumulative plan
would increase the responsiveness of candidates to all minorities. If districts are highly competitive and
minorities occupy a decisive swing vote position, minorities may already be maximizing the effective-
ness of their votes and hence reform would be inappropriate. The swing vote influence of minorities,
however, can be quite limited. See note 15 supra (minorities frequently lack prerequisites for effective
swing vote power).
96. See [1979] MUNICIPAL Y. B., supra note 3, at 100 (over one-third of mayor-council cities have
councils of more than ten seats); Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704, 725 (W.D. Tex. 1972), afT'd
sub nom. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (majority win requirements "[v]irtually unknown
outside the South"); note 46 supra (anti-single-shot voting laws struck down in some states).
97. See R. DIXON, supra note 43, at 521-26 (limited, cumulative, and proportional voting have
been used in only a few cities and states). Outside of the United States, however, proportional repre-
sentation has been used extensively in national elections. See E. LAKEMAN, supra note 47, at 257-61
(listing foreign countries that use proportional systems).
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these reforms would undermine our political stability."
Proportional and limited voting systems are not too difficult for voters
to understand, however. A proportional list system merely requires voters
to list the candidates in order of preference. 9 The only unconventional
task a limited voting system requires of voters is that they decide whether
to cast all of their votes, since their votes for some candidates may help to
defeat others for whom they voted.00 Once voters learn that they need not
cast all of their votes, they can easily avoid this possibility. 1°0
Cumulative voting systems are not difficult for voters to employ. To
take maximum advantage of a cumulative system, a group should nomi-
nate exactly the number of candidates it can elect.102 Minority political
leaders can determine the proper number of candidates once minority
group voting strength is known. Minority group voting strength can usu-
ally be determined from the size of the minority population."3 Once a
group has nominated the correct number of candidates, it must allocate its
votes as equally as possible among its candidates. Because a minority
group normally will nominate a limited number of candidates, minority
voters will frequently be able to cast all of their votes for one candidate or
to divide their votes equally between two candidates.
Voting systems that improve minority representation will not destabilize
our political system by undermining the two-party system. Adopting a
system of proportional representation, for example, would probably not
cause an increase in the number of political parties. Most Western Euro-
pean countries adopted proportional representation systems early in this
century. 104 The change was not followed by a marked increase in the
98. See, e.g., F. HERMENS, DEMOCRACY OR ANARCHY? 398-99 (1941) (proportional representa-
tion too technical for voters); Lipset, Party Systems and the Representation of Social Groups, in
POLITICAL PARTIES 40, 56-57 (R. Macridis ed. 1967) (United States would have developed numerous
political parties if proportional representation had been adopted in national elections); M. DUVERGER,
L'INFLUENCE DES SYSTMES ELECTORAUX SUR LA VIE POLITIQUE 17-21 (1950) (proportional repre-
sentation perpetuates existence of multiple parties and fragments existing political parties).
99. See note 49 supra (discussing use of proportional voting). Voters have encountered no special
difficulties in areas where proportional representation has actually been employed. See E. LAKEMAN,
supra note 47, at 143-50 (electorate has effectively used proportional representation schemes wherever
implemented).
100. See pp. 1817-18 supra (discussing use of limited voting).
101. The need for this strategic decision is avoided entirely if the number of minority.candidates
equals the number of votes each voter may cast.
102. See E. LAKEMAN, supra note 47, at 87-88 (nomination of too many candidates in a cumula-
tive system weakens a group's voting strength).
103. Because of the prevalence of minority bloc voting, see Pettigrew, Black Mayoral Campaigns,
in URBAN GOVERNANCE AND MINORITIES 14, 21 (H. Bryce ed. 1976) (many black constituencies
highly loyal to black candidates), minority group voting strength can be determined if minority politi-
cal leaders know the number of registered minority voters in the community and can estimate the level
of minority voter turnout.
104. See E. LAKEMAN, supra note 47, at 161 (seven of eight European countries using majority
win systems prior to World War One later adopted proportional representation).
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number of parties in any of the countries. 105 Nor has cumulative voting
eroded the two-party system in Illinois, where cumulative voting has
been used in state elections since 1872.16 Cumulative voting has consis-
tently produced a working majority in the Illinois State House of
Representatives. 107
Even if the adoption of electoral schemes designed to increase minority
representation did lead to a proliferation of political parties, it is not clear
that this result would be undesirable. Coalition governments provide more
continuity in policy than do majority systems because one election is un-
likely to turn the entire government out of office. 108 In addition, the inter-
ests of minority parties are more secure if consensus is reached in the
legislature rather than through the electoral process. 0 '
Critics of electoral systems that foster minority representation also ar-
gue that it is undesirable to grant a potential legislative voice to single-
issue extremist political minorities110 There is no clear harm to allowing
the election of such extremist candidates, however. Their views may be
irritating to the majority but they are unlikely to achieve great voting
strength. Furthermore, the appeal of any single-issue extremist candidate
is unlikely to continue over a long period. Unlike racial minorities, whose
shared history of deprivation and discrimination has produced a strong
sense of group identity,"' voters unified around a single issue are unlikely
to be so concerned about that issue that they will forego expressing their
views on all other issues in every election.
Conclusion
State and local governments should reform existing electoral systems in
order to increase the number of minority representatives in state and local
legislative bodies. Including minorities in the political process is an impor-
tant state interest that provides an expansive justification for electoral re-
105. In fact, the number of parties declined in some countries. Id.
106. R. DIXON, supra note 43, at 532.
107. See G. BLAIR, CUMULATIVE VOTING 102-03 (1960) (since 1913, every election has produced
a clear majority party).
108. E. LAKEMAN, supra note 47, at 166.
109. See note 84 supra (public scrutiny of decisionmaking encourages outcomes sensitive to minor-
ity interests).
110. See, e.g., R. STRAETZ, PR POLITICS IN CINCINNATI 201-22 (1958) (perennial charge against
use of proportional representation in Cincinnati municipal elections was that it encouraged "radical-
ism, left-wingism, and . . . Communism"); Zeller & Bone, The Repeal of P.R. in New York
City-Ten Years in Retrospect, 42 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1127, 1133 (1948) (charge in campaign to
eliminate proportional representation in New York City council elections was that it encouraged the
election of Communists and fascists); cf F. HERMIENS, supra note 98, at 145-300 (arguing that pro-
portional representation contributed to rise of fascism in Italy and Germany).
111. See, e.g., A. CAMPBELL, P. CONVERSE, W. MILLER, & D. STOKES, supra note 14, at 170
(blacks most politically cohesive of all ethnic and interest groups surveyed); note 103 supra (black
constituencies frequently loyal to black candidates).
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form. Governments should accomplish reform by altering the method of
electing representatives, not by gerrymandering district boundaries. Such
structural reforms are an appropriately tailored method of furthering the
state's interest in providing all minorities with an opportunity for effective
political participation.
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